Regulering van kartels

Regulering van kartels
Prof. Dr. Jo Seldeslachts Universiteit van Amsterdam & KU Leuven Lerarendag economie 2013

Tandpasta en zeep jarenlang te duur
De Standaard, 3 Oktober 2012 Supermarkten hebben in de periode tussen 2002 en 2007 hun prijzen voor verzorgingsproducten op elkaar afgestemd. Daardoor betaalden consumenten jarenlang te veel voor onderhouds- en verzorgingsproducten. Tot die conclusie kwam de Raad voor de Mededinging, die maandag een jarenlang onderzoek afrondde. De concurrentiewaakhond viel in april 2007 binnen op de hoofdkantoren van zeven grootwarenhuizen, waaronder Carrefour, Colruyt en Delhaize. Daarbij verzamelde hij voornamelijk bezwarend verkeer. Dat het onderzoek zo lang aangesleept heeft, is volgens auditeur-generaal Bert Stulens te wijten aan de complexiteit van het dossier. Hoe kon het dat supermarkten en leveranciers jarenlang prijzen afspreken zonder dat de waakhond dit opmerkt? Bert Stulens, de auditeur generaal, wijst erop dat die markt weinig transparant is voor de buitenwereld. ‘Er zijn erg veel promoties waardoor het lijkt dat er veel beweging in de prijs is’, zegt hij. ‘Maar na elke promotie keert men terug naar het hoge prijsniveau.’ Lerarendag Economie 2013

Tandpasta en zeep jarenlang te duur
De Standaard, 3 Oktober 2013 Het gaat om een lange lijst van producten, waaronder douchegel, tandpasta, scheerschuim, toiletpapier, maandverbanden, luiers, waspoeder en schoonmaakproducten. De betrokken producten zijn goed voor een jaarlijkse omzet van 900 miljoen euro. Als de supermarkten en de leveranciers veroordeeld worden, hangt hen een fikse boete boven het hoofd. In theorie kan die boete oplopen tot tien procent van hun wereldwijde jaaromzet uit Alleen al voor Carrefour, Colruyt en Delhaize kan de gezamenlijke boete oplopen tot tien miljard euro. Lerarendag Economie 2013

Prijsafspraak mechanisme
Tandpasta en zeep jarenlang te duur Prijsafspraak mechanisme Lerarendag Economie 2013

Wat is collusie of kartelvorming?
Bedrijven maximaliseren hun eigen winsten onder ‘normale concurrentie’, zonder daarbij rekening te houden met de gevolgen van hun acties op de winst van andere bedrijven. Collusie is dan de situatie waar sommige of alle bedrijven in een markt hun prijzen en hoeveelheden coördineren. Deze coördinatie wordt gedaan met de bedoeling van het verhogen van prijzen en dus van het verdienen van een hogere winst. De consument verliest dus bij collusie. Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Motivatie voor collusie: imiteren van monopolie
De monopolist doet beter: Productie surplus monopolie > productie surplus duopolie  ½ monopolie winsten > 1 duopolie winst these externalities are internalized if these firms merge to form a monopoly. Lerarendag Economie 2013

Motivatie voor collusie: imiteren van monopolie
Reden: Negatieve externaliteiten tussen bedrijven indien competitie “Als ieder afzonderlijk uitsluitend in zijn/haar eigen belangen handelt, dan produceert dit niet noodzakelijk het maximale voordeel” Prisoner’s Dilemma Not guilty = samenwerken Guilty = niet samenwerken these externalities are internalized if these firms merge to form a monopoly. Lerarendag Economie 2013

Hoe werkt collusie? Kartel van kunstveilinghuizen
Veilinghuizen verkopen kunst en antiek als agent van de eigenaar, in ruil voor een percentage van de verkoopsprijs. Bedrijven: Christie’s, Sotheby’s. Kartel duur: April 1993 tot Februari 2000. Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

"Prijs" is de commissie of percentage van finale biedprijs. Winst tabel (eerste getal in een cel is Christie’s winst) Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Uitkomst (‘evenwicht’) indien competitie: Beide huizen vragen 4% commissie Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Basis voor collusie: Beide huizen zijn beter af met een commissie van 6 % of 8%. Maar hoe raken en blijven ze daar? Christie’s and Sotheby’s anticiperen dat ze herhaaldelijk interacties gaan hebben over de tijd. Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Eern strategie om collusie (8% commissie) te bewaren: Eerste periode, elk veilinghuis vraagt 8%. Elke volgende periode; Elk vraagt 8% als beide dit tot nu toe altijd hebben gedaan Anders vraagt elk 4% Check of dit een ‘stabiel’ kartel is: Veronderstel dat elk veilinghuis de volgende periode maar 90% van de huidige periode waard vindt Collusie rate van 8% geeft dan een totale waarde van x x x … = 2300 ‘Valsspelen’ geeft een totale waarde van x x x … = 1220 Het kartel is stabiel omdat in kartel blijven = 2300 > 1220 = valsspelen Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Beloning-straf schema ondersteunt collusie. Vals spelen geeft in deze periode een relatieve winst van 90 (= ) en een toekomstig verlies van 130 = ( ) in alle volgende periodes. Als Christie’s “nice" is en 8% vraagt dan reageert Sotheby's op dezelfde wijze en vraagt 8% in de volgende periode. Als Christie’s "nasty" is en minder dan 8% vraagt, dan reageert Sotheby’s door de commissie te verlagen tot 4% in de daaropvolgende periodes (waarop Christie’s dan ook het beste 4% zet als rate). Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Problemen die een kartel moet oplossen om te functioneren
Coördineren van akkoord Onderhandelen Communicatie Controleren van akkoord Monitoring van naleving akkoord Straffen indien niet naleving Controleren output bedrijven die niet in kartel zitten Mag niet ontdekt worden door competitie waakhond of klanten Voorbeeld: internationaal staal kartel (1926) Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Why are cartel agreements illegal?
Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” 15 Jo Seldeslachts Lerarendag Economie 2013

Why are cartel agreements illegal?
Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” 16 Jo Seldeslachts Lerarendag Economie 2013

Wat vinden overheden van collusie? Legale behandeling
“Cartels are cancers on the open market economy ....” [Mario Monti, former European Commissioner for Competition, Sept 2000] “.... negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion…” [Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 2004] Collusie is altijd illegaal (‘per se illegal’) in de V.S., E.U. en in de meeste andere jurisdicties Illegaal op grond van het gedrag, onafhankelijk van intentie of effect; de inherente natuur van de praktijk is slecht en brengt schade toe. Er is geen verdediging mogelijk (enkele industrieën zijn vrijgesteld). Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Types van collusie in de praktijk
Expliciete/openlijke collusie: coördinatie door directe communicatie Wanneer bedrijven direct communiceren over prijs, marktverdeling, en andere informatie die de coordinatie tussen bedrijven vergamekkelijkt. Legale status: altijd illegaal. Stilzwijgende collusie: coördinatie door indirecte communicatie Wanneer een minder competitief resultaat wordt bereikt door een onderlinge verstandhouding tussen bedrijven, prijsleiderschap, of marktsignalering met behulp van instrumenten zoals prijs Legale status: meestal legaal Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Het lysine kartel Een voorbeeld van expliciete collusie
Een internationaal kartel voor dierenvoeding in de jaren 90 Kartel is er in geslaagd om gedurende 9 maanden de prijs 70% te verhogen Informatie verkregen via undercover rol voor de FBI van manager in een van de participerende bedrijven Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

FCC spectrum veilingen Een voorbeeld van expliciete collusie
Achtergrond Biedingen waren publiek Elke licensie had een nummer. Lubbock, Texas was 264 and Amarillo, Texas was 013 Biedingen waren in dollars en hadden minstens 6 cijfers Bieders hebben de laatste cijfers gebruikt om te coordineren Voor de Lubbock licensie: bieder Mercury PCS wilde dat bieder High Plains stopte met bieden op Lubbock Om dit duidelijk te maken ging Mercury hoog bieden op Amarillo, waar High Plains op dat moment hoogste bieder was. Om intenties te signaliseren, bood Mercury een bedrag dat eindigde op 264. Bv., een bod kan $1,600,264 geweest zijn Om de boodschap helemaal duidelijk te maken, bracht Mercury de volgende keer op de Lubbock licensie een bod uit dat eindigde op 013 De boodschap kwam aan. High Plains stopte met bieden op Lubbock, en Mercury stopte daarna met bieden op Amarillo Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Mededingingsbeleid Fazes & Bewijsverzameling
Ontdekking Vervolging Boetes Verzamelen en ontwikkeling van bewijzen Rapporteren door consumenten of rivalen Klokkeluiders & clementieregeling Onaangekondigde inspecties (‘Dawn raids’) Economische analyse Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Klokkeluiders & clementieregeling De InBev case
Vier bierbrouwers vormden een kartel op de biermarkt in Nederland In 2007 heeft de EC de drie toonaangevende Nederlandse brouwerijen Heineken, Grolsch en Bavaria beboet voor een totaal van 274 miljoen Euro voor de exploitatie van dit kartel tussen ten minste 1996 en 1999 Essentiële informatie over dit kartel kwam van InBev, dat het 4e lid van het kartel was De informatie van InBev leidde tot onaangekondigde inspecties De EC vond handgeschreven notities genomen op de vergaderingen, en bewijs van data Dankzij de clementieregeling heeft InBev geen boete betaald concerted practices => parallel behavior. directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; share markets or sources of supply; apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties; making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts. Concerted practices: think of a real-life concert. Lerarendag Economie 2013

Clementie: destabilizeren van kartels Vergelijking van clementieregelingen
Plea – onderhandelen van lagere boete/straf in ruil voor informatie concerted practices => parallel behavior. directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; share markets or sources of supply; apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties; making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts. Concerted practices: think of a real-life concert. Lerarendag Economie 2013

Mededingingsbeleid Boetes
Onderneming Geldboete aan overheid In verhouding van schade aangedaan aan consumenten Individu Persoonlijke geldboete aan overheid Ontslag Gevangenisstraf Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Afschrikking Idealiter moet de boete zo gezet worden dat de verwachte kosten van collusie (veel) hoger zijn dan de verwachte winsten Als afschrikking goed werkt, dan gaan bedrijven nooit een kartel vormen en moeten de boetes nooit worden toegepast Practische moeilijkheden Wat is de kans dat een kartel wordt opgespoord en veroordeeld? Wat zouden winsten geweest zijn zonder kartel? Potentieel bankroet van bedrijven zet limiet ip maximale boetes Hoe wordt gevangenis gevalueerd door individu? Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Clementie en boetes in de V.S. Kunstveilinghuizen
Lerarendag Economie 2013

Kartel van Belgische supermarkten
Wat te verwachten? Wat zou ideale uitkomst zijn volgens jullie? Lerarendag Economie 2013

Video: Het bouwkartel in Nederland
Lerarendag Economie 2013

Referenties Harrington J., 2011, “Lectures on Collusive Practices”, Cresse Summer School, Greece Seldeslachts J. , 2012, “Deterrence in Competition Policy”, Lecture CISS Summerschool, Turkey Externality: firms maximize own profits, not taking into account repercussions of their actions to other firms. Why are cartel agreements illegal? Historical perspective (Motta, 9-10), the case of Germany: second half 19th century, prevailing view was that cartels were an instrument to control the instability created by cut-throat competition and price warfare. This idea, coupled with the feature that the freedom of contracting was one of the governing principles of competition laws, implied that in Germany not only price agreements were permitted, but also that they were enforcable in courts. tacit collusion: Why is there no Wal-Mart in the Netherlands? Motta p.33 on Article 81 Treaty of Rome on Horizontal and Vertical Agreements: “Note that agreements need not be written or be formal agreements, for them to be prohibited, as the reference in Article 81 to the term of concerted practices makes clear. However, the term itself leaves space for interpretation. Today pure market “parallel behavior” without any attempt from the firms involved to communicate with each other or establish practices which help sustain collusion would probably not be judged by the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).” Lerarendag Economie 2013

Regulering van kartels

Verwante presentaties

Presentatie over: "Regulering van kartels"— Transcript van de presentatie:

Verwante presentaties

Over het project

Feedback

Inloggen

Inloggen via een sociaal netwerk:

Regulering van kartels

Verwante presentaties

Presentatie over: "Regulering van kartels"— Transcript van de presentatie:

Verwante presentaties

Over het project

Feedback